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Politically Motivated Labor Actions in the United 
States and England: A Comparison of Judicial and 
Legislative Treatment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American and English courts have recently confronted the issue of the legality 
of politically motivated labor actions. Because such actions involve more than the 
economic relationship between a union and an employer, the courts in both 
countries have had difficulty in applying labor legislation and case law to these 
politically motivated activities.! 
In the United States, recent foreign events produced litigation concerning 
such politically motivated labor actions. In December 1979, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan.2 On January 4, 1980, President Carter responded by 
imposing an embargo on certain exports to the Soviet Union.3 On January 9, 
1980, the President of the .International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) 
issued a directive to ILA members ordering them to stop handling cargo bound 
to or from the Soviet Union or carried on Soviet vessels.4 ILA locals in ports 
along the Great Lakes, the Atlantic, and the Gulf Coast then refused to refer ILA 
members for any work on Russian vessels or cargoes.5 
The ILA boycott raised questions concerning the extent to which a labor union 
can voice a political protest through a work stoppage or other action. In the 
I. See Allied International, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1372 n.3 (1st 
Cir. 1981); Sherard v. Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, 1973 Indus. Ct. R. 421, 435. 
2. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1979, at I, col. 5. 
3. Soviet Invasion of Afghahistan, 16 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 25, 26-27 (Jan. 11, 1980). 
4. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 214-15 n.1 (1982). 
This broad directive stated: 
In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of the union, the 
leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension in handling all Russian ships and 
all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are 
employed .... 
The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events that have 
affected relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by the demands of the 
workers. 
It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes under present conditions 
in the world. 
People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as long as the 
Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a decision in which the Union leadership 
concurs. 
5. Comment, Protest Boycotts and Fetkral Labor Laws: The Russian Tratk Boycott Litigation, 3 Nw. J. 
INT'L L. & Bus. 211, 229 (1981). 
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United States, the Supreme Court answered these questions In two recently 
decided cases. In the first, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n,6 the Court held that the employer could not obtain an 
injunction to halt the boycott for the limited period pending an arbitrator's 
determination of whether the work stoppage violated the specific terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union. 7 In the 
second, International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International, Inc.,8 the Court 
held that the ILA's boycott was an illegal secondary boycott9 under Section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)lO and that the 
political motivation behind this activity did not exempt it from these provisions.ll 
English trade unions have engaged in political protests over both foreign 
events and their own government's policies and legislation.12 Under English law, 
the legality of a trade union's action is determined according to a two-pronged 
test. First, the dispute involved must fall within the statutory definition of a 
"trade dispute."13 Second, the action must be one taken "in contemplation or 
6. 457 U.S. 702 (1982). 
7. [d. at 723-24. 
8. 456 U.S. 212 (1982). 
9. A secondary boycott has been defined as the "refusal to work for, purchase from or handle 
products of a secondary employer with whom the union has no dispute with an object of forcing that 
employer to stop doing business with the primary employer with whom the union has a dispute." C. 
CornelIa, Inc. v. United Farmworkers Organizing Committee, 33 Ohio App. 2d 61, 72, 292 N.E.2d 647, 
656 (1972). 
10. Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley 
Act, in 1947. Pub. L. No. 101,61 Stat. 136 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976 &: 
Supp. V 1981». The LMRA amended and re-enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which 
Congress had passed in 1935. Pub. L. No. 198,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-169 (1976 &: Supp. V 1981». Except when discussing specific court findings, this Comment 
shall refer to the NLRA provisions as part of the LMRA. 
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the LMRA, Pub. L. No. 101, § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976» provides in part: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
4 ... (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in any industry 
affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is -
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or othErwise 
dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing 
business with any other person .... 
Although the section does not specifically mention the term, the majority in Congr~ss intended this 
language to prohibit the common law concept of a secondary boycott. See 93 CONGo REc. 3432 (1947) 
(comments of Mr. Landis); S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (minority report), reprinted in 1 
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 463,481-83 (1948). 
11. Allied, 456 U.S. at 226. 
12. See infra notes 112-32 and accompanying text. 
13. A trade dispute is defined in § 29 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (T.U.L.R.A.) as: 
(I) ... a dispute between workers and their employer which relates wholly or mainly to one or 
more of the following, that is to say -
(a) terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions in which any workers 
are required to work; 
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furtherance of a trade dispute."14 If an activity satisfies this test, its organizers are 
immune from common law criminal and civil liabilities. 15 English courts have 
interpreted the statutory immunities to exclude purely political disputes from 
the definition of a trade dispute,16 but until recently the immunities system 
protected trade disputes with political elements.17 In the Employment Bills of 
1980 and 1982, however, Parliament greatly limited the definition of a trade 
dispute so that virtually all politically motivated trade union activity is now 
prohibited under English law. 
This Comment examines American and English law relating to politically 
motivated strikes and boycotts. The American section focuses primarily on the 
ILA Russian trade boycott litigation. The Comment next discusses how the Allied 
and Jacksonville decisions reflect federal labor policies. The Comment also studies 
English statutory and case law governing politically motivated strikes and exam-
ines the effect of recent employment legislation on such strikes. The author 
concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court and the British Parliament have both 
virtually eliminated a union's ability to engage in a political strike. Unlike Parlia-
ment, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has made this determination without 
limiting employees' rights to engage in other concerted activities. 
II. POLITICALLY MOTIVATED LABOR ACTIONS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 
The ILA boycott produced litigation which raised the issue of the legality of 
union protest activities. In the past, the ILA has engaged in other protests, most 
of which were aimed at the actions and policies of communist governments. 'S 
(b) engagement or non-engagement. or termination or suspension of employment or the 
duties of employment. of one or more workers; 
(c) allocation of work or the duties of employment as between workers or groups of workers 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act. 1974. ch. 52. § 29. amended by Employment Act. 1982. ch. 46. 
§ 18. 
14. This requirement is based on § 13 of T.U.L.R.A .• as amended. which reads: 
(I) An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be 
actionable in tort on the ground only -
(a) that it induces another person to break a contract or interferes or induces any other 
person to interfere with its performance; or 
(b) that it consists in his threatening that a contract (whether one to which he is a party or 
not) Will be broken or Its performance mterfered with. or that he will induce another person 
to break a contract or to interfere with its performance. 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act. 1974. ch. 52. § 13. amended by Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Amendment) Act. 1976. ch. 7. 
15. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT. TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES. Cmd. 8128. at 2 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES]. 
16. See British Broadcasting Corp. v. Hearn. [1977] I W.L.R. 1004. discussed infra at notes 119-22 
and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text. 
18. For example. the lLA has engaged in boycotts to protest the role of the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China in the Korean War. Comment. supra note 5. at 219-20; see N.Y. Times. Aug. 
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These activities did not induce much litigation because of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the LMRA's applicability to political union activities.19 The 1980 
boycott protesting the invasion of Afghanistan differed from previous protest 
activities because it incited numerous lawsuits, all of which involved the issue of 
the applicability of federal labor legislation to political protest activity.20 
Employers attempted to end the 1980 1LA boycott using one of two ap-
proaches. Under the first, the "secondary boycott approach," those hurt by the 
boycott filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB)21 or brought a private suit22 charging that the ILA activity was an 
illegal secondary boycott under Section 8(b)( 4)(ii)(B) of the LMRA. Under the 
second, the "section 301 approach," employers sought to enjoin. the strike pend-
ing mandatory arbitration or to enforce an already rendered arbitration award 
pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA.23 
A. The Secondary Boycott Approach 
Several employers sought to end ILA activity by characterizing it as an illegal 
secondary boycott. These employers argued that the action was secondary be-
cause union leadership had instructed its members not to handle Soviet products 
and the union had its primary dispute with the Soviet Union.24 This litigation 
produced a conflict between the First and Fifth Circuits. 
24, 1950, at 52, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. I, 1950, at 41, col. I; to protest the Soviet invasion of Hungary 
in 1956, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1956, at 10, col. 5; and to protest the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 
1968, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1968, at 16, col. 2. The lLA imposed similar boycotts to protest the South 
African policy of apartheid, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1972, at 2, col. 6 and id., Mar. 22, 1972, at 5, col. I, 
and to protest the seizure of the American hostages in Tehran in 1979, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1979, at 
A12, col. 2. 
19. See Comment, supra note 5, at 214. In NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 
992 (4th Cir. 1964), the NLRB sought to enforce its order requiring the ILA to resume working a vessel 
engaged in trade with Cuba. The Fourth Circuit held that the ILA's refusal did not involve a labor 
dispute, as required by the NLRA. Thus, the NLRB did not have jurisdiction over the activity.Id. at 996. 
20. Se. infra notes 24-90 and accompanying text. 
21. The LMRA forbids both employers and unions from engaging in certain defined labor related 
actions and empowers the NLRB to seek an injunction against these activities if a complaint is filed. 29 
U.S.C. § 158, 160(/) (1976). 
22. Section 303(b) of the LMRA gives an individual who is injured by union violations of § 8(b)(4) the 
power to bring a private suit. Pub. L. No. 101, § 303(b), 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.c. 
§ 187(b) (1976». 
23. Section 301(a) reads: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing 
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such 
labor organizations may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the 
citizenship of the parties. 
Pub. L. No. 101, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976». 
24. Respondent's Brief at 10, International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International, Inc., 456 
U.S. 212 (1982). 
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In Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n ,25 the Fifth Circuit held that the 
ILA boycott was not "in commerce" and thus did not satisfy the NLRA's jurisdic-
tional requirements.26 Because the boycott was not subject to the NLRA's sec-
ondary boycott provisions, the court could not issue an injunction to halt the 
activity.27 In contrast, the First Circuit in Allied International, Inc. v. International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n28 found that the boycott was "in commerce" and thus subject 
to the NLRA.29 The court held that the ILA had violated Section 8(b)(4) because 
it threatened Allied International, Inc., a neutral employer with whom it had no 
dispute.3o Thus, the First Circuit's interpretation of the same political protest 
activity directly conflicted with that of the Fifth Circuit in Baldovin. 31 
The ILA appealed the First Circuit's decision to the Supreme CourL In 
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International, Inc ,32 the Court granted 
certiorari to determine the extent of the coverage of Section 8(b)(4) over the facts 
of the case33 and thereby resolve the conflicts between the circuits. In a unani-
mous opinion, the Court analyzed the specific terms of Section 8(b)( 4) and 
concluded that the plain language of the statUte covered the ILA boycott because 
the boycott was designed to influence individuals employed in an industry 
affecting commerce, namely the importing and shipping industry.34 The Court 
found the boycott was "secondary" because its purpose was to force Allied, 
Waterman, and Clark, the stevedore company, "to cease doing business" with 
each other and to cease dealing with Russian products.35 
Despite the applicability of the language of the secondary boycott provisions, 
these provisions could only apply if the Court found NLRA jurisdiction. To 
25. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980). 
26. Id. at 453-54. The secondary boycott provisions of the LMRA apply to actions aimed at a "person 
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i) (1976). In finding 
that the boycott was not "in commerce" the court cited a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with 
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 143 (1957), which held that the NLRA does not apply 
to "labor disputes between nationals of other countries operating ships under foreign laws." Baldovin, 
626 F.2d at 450. See also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 
(1963); Incres Steamship Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963). The Court 
also found the Benz reasoning applicable when American unions picketed foreign ships. The picketing 
was not "in commerce" because its primary object was to raise the operating costs of the foreign vessels. 
Baldovin, 626 F.2d at 451. See Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 
(1974); American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974). 
27. Baldovin, 626 F.2d at 454. 
28. 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981). 
29. /d. at 1374. The court found the boycott subject to the NLRA because "the only labor-related 
activity in issue has been played out by an all-American cast" and the application of the NLRA would not 
interfere with any foreign entities. /d. 
30. Id. at 1377. 
31. Baldovin, 626 F.2d 445. 
32. 456 U.S. 212 (1982). 
33. Id.at 218. 
34. Id. at 218-19. 
35. Id. at 219. 
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determine whether the boycott satisfied the statutory standards, the Court ana-
lyzed the meaning of the words "in commerce" according to its line of cases 
dealing with foreign commerce.36 These cases, beginning with Benz v. Compania 
Naviera Hidalgo,37 held that neither the activities aboard foreign ships nor Amer-
ican picketing of these ships is "in commerce."38 The Allied Court determined 
that the purpose of these decisions was to prevent U.S. labor legislation from 
interfering with the maritime operations of foreign ships. The tradition of 
restraint in applying U.S. law to foreign ships was irrelevant to this case, how-
ever, because the action involved an American union, importer, and vessel,39 
Thus, the Court held that the ILA boycott was within the jurisdiction established 
by the Act.40 
The Court next determined that the boycott was the exact type of conduct 
prohibited by the secondary boycott provisions because its object was to force a 
neutral party to stop doing business with another business or entity.41 Although 
the union claimed that its object was not to halt Allied's business with respect to 
Russian goods, the Court determined that the pressure placed on secondary 
parties was foreseeable and thus one of the objects of the boycott.42 Responding 
to the ILA's argument that the boycott was caused by a political dispute with the 
Soviet Union rather than by a labor dispute with a primary employer, the Court 
declined to limit the scope of Section 8(b)( 4) by creating a "political exception" to 
the statute43 which Congress did not intend to create.44 Finally, the Court held 
that the ILA boycott was not protected as free speech under the First Amend-
ment.45 
Thus, the Supreme Court in Allied affirmed the First Circuit and held that the 
ILA's politically motivated boycott was "in commerce" and within the scope of 
36. [d. See supra note 26. 
37. 353 U.S. 138 (1957). 
38. See supra note 26. 
39. AlIUti, 456 U.S. at 221-22. 
40. The Court supported its finding of jurisdiction with two other considerations. First, if the NLRA 
was not applicable to this boycott, conflicting state decisions could frustrate the NLRA's purpose of 
establishing a uniform national labor policy. Second, because the boycott differed significantly from 
President Carter's embargo, the action affected U.S. foreign policy, thus supporting a finding of federal 
jurisdiction. [d. at n.17. 
41. The Court listed the elements ofa § 8(b)(4) violation: "Employees must be induced; they must be 
induced to engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object must be to force or require their employer 
or another person to cease doing business with a third person." Allied, 456 U.S. at 222, n.18, quoting 
Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1958). 
42. [d. at 224. 
43. The Court reasoned that "[w)e would create a large and undefinable exception to the statute if we 
accepted the argument that 'political' boycotts are exempt from the secondary boycott provision. The 
distinction between labor and political objectives would be difficult to draw in many cases." [d. at 225. 
44. [d. at 225. See generally 93 CoNG. REc. 4198 (1947). 
45. [d. Allied, 456 U.S. at 227. "There are many ways in which a union and its individual members 
may express their opposition to Russian foreign policy without infringing upon the rights of others." [d. 
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the NLRA.46 Because of the foreseeable burden it placed upon neutral employ-
ers, it fell within the Act's secondary boycott provisionsY Since the language and 
legislative history of these provisions contain no exceptions for political second-
ary boycotts, the ILA action was an illegal secondary boycott under Section 
8(b)( 4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA.48 
B. The Section 301 Approach 
Several employers adversely affected by the ILA boycott attempted to enjoin 
the work stoppage through Section 301 49 proceedings to enforce the arbitration 
clauses contained in their respective collective bargaining agreements.50 These 
suits sought to e~oin the boycott pending mandatory arbitration proceedings.5! 
Section 301, enacted in 1947 as part of the LMRA, grants federal courts 
jurisdiction over suits for violations of contracts between employers and 
unions,52 and allows a labor union to "sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of 
the employees whom it represents .... "53 Congress hoped Section 301 would 
encourage the peaceable settlement of contract disputes through judicially en-
forceable grievance procedures and no-strike clauses contained in collective 
bargaining agreements.54 
The congressional policy favoring arbitration and judicial involvement often 
46. [d. at 221. 
47. [d. at 224. 
48. [d. at 226. 
49. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976); See supra note 23 for text. 
50. The collective bargaining agreement is a written agreement between the employer and the union 
which sets out the relationship between them and among the employees themselves. The agreement 
generally contains provisions such as those dealing with union recognition, grievance procedures, 
wages, hours, discipline, and seniority. The agreement regulates the terms and tenure of individual 
employees' employment, although each is hired separately under an individual contract of employment. 
R. GoRMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 540 (1976). 
51. Most collective bargaining agreements contain express provisions for the resolution of contract 
disputes through internal company machinery rather than by court procedures. Complaints are gener-
ally brought by the union or an individual grievant to low level supervisors. If the dispute remains 
unresolved after being brought to higher levels, the question is usually submitted to an arbitrator 
selected by the parties to the agreement. R. Gorman, supra note 50, at 541-42. 
52. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). See supra note 23. 
53. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976). 
54. See the Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 
363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 
(1960); Urtited Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Supreme Court 
has interpreted § 301 as a basis for affirmative relief for violations of the collective bargaining 
agreement. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). This relief has primarily 
been in the form of court orders to arbitrate or to enforce or set aside an arbitrator's award. See American 
Manufacturing, 363 U.S. at 569, Warrior Gulf, 363 U.S. at 585, and Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 599. Section 
301 has also been held to govern actions for breaches of no-strike clauses, damage awards against 
unions in cases where the employer had no other means of enforcing the no-strike promise, see 
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1967), and an action for an injunction, see Boys Markets, 
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See also infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
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clashed with the earlier national policies embodied in Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.55 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 in order 
to protect employees engaged in peaceful concerted activities from injunctions 
issued by federal courts at the request of employers.56 By removing jurisdiction 
to issue injunctions from federal courts, Congress attempted to limit judicial 
regulation of labor activities in order to give employees the freedom to organize 
and engage in concerted activities.57 
Because the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Section 301 of the LMRA differ in 
their treatment of judicial involvement in labor disputes, courts have had to 
balance the two legislative policies. In order to encourage arbitration and the 
enforcement of no-strike promises as ways of resolving labor disputes, the 
Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union 58 provided a narrow 
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court held that a court may issue an 
injunction halting a strike when the collective bargaining contract contains a 
mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure, the petitioner is 
ready to arbitrate, and the petitioner has suffered and will continue to suffer 
irreparable injury.59 The Court based its reasoning on the federal policy favor-
ing arbitration as an effective, peaceful method' of resolving industrial dis-
putes.60 
55. Pub. L. No. 65,47 Stat. 70, 70-71 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976», which provides in 
part: 
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or tempo-
rary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to 
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are 
herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: 
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment .... 
/d. 
56. See 75 CONGo lac. 4618-30, 5463-68 (1932). At common law, an employer sought an injunction 
against concerted labor activity because it 
could promptly put an end to the strike, picketing or boycott. Although often issued only 
temporarily, or pending a full hearing on the merits of the case, the injunction would usually 
succeed in breaking the momentum and the will of the employees and effectively terminating 
the activities permanently .... [T]he employer could frequently secure the injunction 
without notice to or hearing for the union, with proof based on dubious and stylized affidavits. 
with proceedings before a judge rather than a jury which might be more sympathetic to the 
defendant workingman .... 
R. GoRMAN, supra note 50, at 604. 
57. See 75 CoNG. lac. 4509 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Norris). See also R. KORETZ & B. ScHWARTZ, 
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE U.S.: LABOR ORGANIZATION 173-74 (1970). 
[d. 
58. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). 
59. [d. at 253-54. 
60. [d. at 253. The Court concluded: 
[T]he unavailability of equitable relief in the arbitration context presents a serious impediment 
to the Congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the 
peaceful resolution of labor disputes ... [T]he core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not 
sacrifice~ by the limited use of equitable remedies to further this policy, and consequently ... 
the NorrIS-LaGuardia Act does not bar the granting of i~unctive relief in the circumstances of 
the instant case. 
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Following Boys Markets, the courts faced the problem of whether a court may 
enjoin a strike involving issues not covered by the arbitration provisions. 6 ) In 
such cases, the act of striking itself is the only alleged breach of contract the 
employer can challenge under the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining 
agreement.62 In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers ,63 the Court held that Boys 
Markets did not permit a court to enjoin a strike over a nonarbitrable issue.64 
While the question of whether the strike itself violated a no-strike clause might 
be subject to arbitration, a court cannot enjoin the strike pending the arbitrator's 
decision on that question.65 Thus, in Buffalo Forge, the Supreme Court further 
defined the limited scope of the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. 
Several employers injured by the ILA boycott attempted to enjoin the boycott 
pursuant to Section 301 pending arbitration as to whether the work stoppage 
violated the no-strike clauses of their collective bargaining agreements. In 
Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,66 the Fourth 
Circuit held that because the underlying political dispute between the ILA and 
the Soviet Union clearly was not arbitrable, a Boys Markets injunction could not be 
issued.67 The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in New Orleans Steamship 
Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers,68 in which the court held that a strike called to 
further a political goal is a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia ACt.69 Because the underlying (political) dispute was not arbitrable, 
the court could not issue an injunction pending arbitration. 70 
One employer appealed the Fifth Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court. In 
61. R. GoRMAN, supra note 50, at 612. 
62. Id. 
63. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). 
64. Id. at 404. 
65. Id. at 410. As the Court explained its reasoning: 
Id. 
[lIt does not follow that the District Court was empowered not only to order arbitration but to 
enjoin the strike pending the decision of the arbitrator, despite the express prohibition of § 
4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act .... If an injunction could issue against the strike in this case, 
so in proper circumstances could a court enjoin any other alleged breach of contract pending 
the exhaustion of the applicable grievance and arbitration provisions even though the i~unc­
tion would otherwise violate one of the express prohibitions of § 4 .... This would cut deeply 
into the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. ... 
66. 631 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 458 U.S. 1105 (1982). 
67. Id. at 286. 
68. 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc., v. International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982). 
69. Id. at 465; a labor dispute is defined in § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: 
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
taining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of 
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 
Pub. L. No. 65, 47 Stat. 70, 73 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.c. § 113(c) (1976». 
70. /d. at 468-69. 
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Jacksonville Bulk. Terminals v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,7l Justice Mar-
shalF2 addressed the Section 301 approach to ending the ILA boycott. Before 
the Supreme Court, the ILA conceded that the question of whether the work 
stoppage violated the no-strike clause was arbitrable.73 Therefore, the questions 
before the Court were whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act was applicable to 
politically motivated work stoppages and whether this boycott could be enjoined 
pending arbitration.74 
The Court first considered whether the facts presented a "case involving or 
growing out of any labor dispute" as required by Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.75 This Act defines a labor dispute as one which concerns terms 
or conditions of employment. 76 The Court stated that the plain language of the 
Act does not except politically motivated labor disputes from its coverage.77 In 
addition, Section 4 does not require that each dispute relevant to the case be a 
labor dispute; the case must merely involve "any" labor dispute.7s Since the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act removes jurisdiction in labor disputes from federal 
courts, the ILA boycott could not be enjoined.79 The Court further found that 
the case involved a labor dispute based on its prior interpretations of the Act. In 
previous decisions, the Court had held that the term "labor dispute" must not be 
narrowly construed,so that the necessary element is "whether the employer-
employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy,"Sl and that "the exis-
tence of non-economic motives does not make the Norris-LaGuardia Act inap-
plicable."s2 The Court found all these factors relevant.S3 
The Court also stated that the legislative history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
supports the conclusion that it applies to politically motivated work stoppages.S4 
The Court found that in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments "Congress de-
clined ... to adopt a broad 'political motivation' exception to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act for strikes in protest of some governmental policy."s5 Instead, in 
71. Jacksonville, 457 U.S. 702 (1982). 
72. Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined in Marshall's opinion, while Justice 
O'Connor concurred. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Stevens dissented. Id. at 703. 
73. Id. at 707 n.5. 
74. Id. at 704. 
75. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976); see supra note 55. 
76. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976); see supra note 69. 
77. Jacksonville, 457 U.S. at 711. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 712, citing Marine Cooks &: Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960). 
81. Id. at 712-13, quoting Columbia Rivers Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942). 
82. Id. at 714, citing New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938). 
83. Id. at 711-15. 
84. Id. at 715-17. See 75 CONGo REc. 5471-73 (1932), in which Representative Beck argued that the 
Act should not protect political strikes such as those threatened in Europe at the time. This idea was 
rejected, however, when Congress defeated the amendment Beck had proposed to the Act. 
85. Id. at 718. 
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Section 10(/) Congress gave power to the NLRB, not private parties, to petition 
for an injunction against such activities if they took the form of secondary 
boycotts. 86 Thus, the Court interpreted the plain language, past decisions, and 
legislative history of the Act to hold that a politically motivated work stoppage is 
a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In so doing, the 
Court declined to remove the dispute from the Act's coverage because it did not 
want to "embroil federal judges in the very scrutiny of 'legitimate objectives' that 
Congress intended to prevent when it passed the Act."87 
Since the Norris-LaGuardia Act was applicable, the Court next considered 
whether the boycott could be enjoined pending arbitration under the rationale 
of the Boys Markets case. The Court rejected the employer's argument that the 
underlying dispute which caused the boycott was over conflicting interpretations 
of the management rights clause of the agreement88 and was thus an arbitrable 
issue. The Court stated that the union called the boycott to protest the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and that this underlying dispute was not arbitrable 
under the collective bargaining agreement. Following Buffalo Forge, the boycott 
could not be enjoined pending the arbitrators decision on whether the no-strike 
clause had been violated. 89 Thus, inJacksonville, the Supreme Court held that an 
employer's Section 301 action to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement allegedly violated by a politically motivated strike involved a labor 
dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that no injunction 
could issue pending arbitration.90 
C. Allied and Jacksonville as a Reflection of National Labor Policies 
In his Jacksonville dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that the Allied and 
Jacksonville decisions could not be reconciled in a rational way.9! These two cases 
are not inconsistent, however, if they are viewed as an attempt by the Court to 
balance federal labor policies which restrict the judiciary's use of injunctions92 on 
the one hand, but favor judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses in collective 
bargaining agreements93 and the provisions of the LMRA94 on the other. 
86. [d. at 719. 
87. [d. 
88. /d. at 721. This clause vested management with the exclusive power to control the business, 
except as provided in the agreement. 
89. /d. 
90. [d. at 723-24. 
91. [d. at 729. The Chief Justice argued that it is inconsistent for the Court to hold the union liable 
for damages caused by its violation of § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA in Allied and, at the same time, to hold that 
the boycott could not be enjoined under the Boys Markets case. Burger blamed this inconsistency on "the 
artificial Buffaw Forge exception," which he stated should be overruled because it forces the Court to 
"engage in mechanical and contradictory analyses as to the character of disputes such as this one .... " 
[d. 
92. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
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Under Jacksonville, the federal courts are limited in their ability to enjoin the 
union's activity, if only for the period pending arbitration. Arbitration remains 
important, however, since the parties must arbitrate the question of whether the 
work stoppage violates the no-strike clause. Yet it is not clear how the Court 
would decide the issue if there were no such clause in the collective bargaining 
agreement.95 Under Allied, neutral parties are protected from damage due to 
politically motivated strikes because the LMRA's secondary boycott provisions 
are applicable if the boycott is a secondary boycott. 96 Through these decisions, 
the Supreme Court has determined that politically motivated actions by labor 
unions are subject to the same protections and liabilities as other labor actions. 
The extent of protection or liability will depend upon the facts of the case and 
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement involved. 
III. POLITICALLY MOTIVATED LABOR ACTIONS UNDER ENGLISH LAw 
In England, courts and commentators have had difficulty in precisely defining 
a "political strike."97 Such actions have generally been political in the sense that 
unions carried them out either in opposition to government legislation or poli-
cies, or in support of social or political objectives.9B In England, industrial 
relations are governed by a system of statutory immunities which exempt trade 
unions and individuals involved in trade disputes from common law liabilities.99 
Rather than enacting legislation granting defined legal rights to trade unions, 
Parliament developed the system of immunities in response to a history of 
judicial interference in industrial conflict on behalf of employers. loo English 
workers did not pressure Parliament for positive protection because, unlike their 
American counterparts, English trade unions developed before many workers 
were given the right to vote. IOI The legality of political strikes has depended on 
the "negative" protection of the statutory immunities. Although the immunities 
excluded purely political disputes from the definition of a trade dispute l02 prior 
94. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
95. Jacksonvilk, 457 U.S. at 713 n.12: "A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case 
even in the absence of the dispute over the no-strike clause .... We need not decide this question, 
however, because this case does involve a dispute over the interpretation of the parties' collective-
bargaining agreement." 
96. See supra notes 32-48 and accom panying text. 
97. See. e.g., Sherard v. Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, 1973 Indus. Ct. R. 421, 435 
(statement by Lord Roskill); TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 15, at 49. 
98. See INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT: A CoMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 323 (B. Aaron & K. Wedderburn eds. 
1972). 
99. Wedderburn •. The Law and Industrial Conflict in Great Britain, in LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE LAw: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 127 (0. Kahn-Freund ed. 1965). 
100. See id. at 127-28. 
101. M. MORAN, THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 6 (1977). 
102. See British Broadcasting Corp. v. Hearn, [1977]1 W.L.R. 1004, discussed infra at notes 118-21 
and accompanying text. 
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to the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982, they did protect trade disputes with 
political elements. l03 Recent legislation has, however, removed this protection 
from virtually all politically motivated disputes. 
A. English Political Strikes Prior to 1980 
During the nineteenth century, the common law greatly curtailed trade union 
organization and activities by subjecting unions and their members to criminal 
prosecution for the offenses of obstruction, molestation, intimidation, and con-
spiracy.l04 In response, Parliament granted trade unions immunity from liability 
for these criminal acts in the Trade Union Act 187 p05 and the Conspiracy and 
Protection of Property Act 1875.106 
During the late nineteenth century, however, the courts began to restrict 
unions through the civil law, developing civil liability for conspiracy, and subject-
ing strike organizers to prosecution for the tort of inducing a breach of the 
strikers' employment contracts. 107 Due to trade union pressure, Parliament 
reduced judicial interference with industrial relations by passing the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906.108 Section 1 of the Act protected a person acting "in contem-
plation of furtherance of a trade dispute"109 from liability for civil conspiracy.1l0 
Section 3 provided immunity for inducing another person to break a contract of 
employment or interfering with the trade, business, or employment of an-
other. lll Under the 1906 Act, several courts nevertheless found political strikes 
unprotected because the strikes did not satisfy the definition of a trade dis-
pute.u 2 
In 1971, the Conservative government attempted to solve problems in indus-
trial relations through extensive legal regulation by enacting the Industrial 
103. See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text. 
104. TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 15, at 11-12. 
105. Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Viet., ch. 3!. 
106. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Viet., ch. 86. See TRADE UNION 
IMMUNITIES, supra note 15, at 12-14. 
107. TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 15, at 13. 
108. Trade Disputes Act, 1906,6 Edw. 7, ch. 47. 
109. Courts and commentators have often called this phrase the "golden formula." It has been used 
to define the statutory immunity given to concerted union activity since the 1875 legislation. TRADE 
UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 15, at 13. 
110. Id. at 15. 
II!. Section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906,6 Edw. 7, ch. 47 read: 
An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be 
actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of 
employment or that it is an interference with the trade, business or employment of some other 
person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wills. 
Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, § 3. 
112. See Nat'l Sailors' & Firemen's Union of Great Britain & Ireland v. Reed, [1926] I Ch. 536; 
Associated Newspapers Group Ltd. v. Flynn, (1970) 10 Knight's Indus. R. 17. 
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Relations Act 1971.113 The new legislation repealed the 1906 Act and established 
a new system of industrial law114 but maintained the main trade union im-
munities. II5 In response to trade union opposition to the 1971 Act's increased 
regulation of industrial relations, the Labour Party came into power in 1974 
committed to the Act's repeal. 116 In the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
(TULRA) of 1974, Parliament repealed the 1971 Act and returned, in Section 
13, to the system of immunities provided under the 1906 ACt. I17 In Section 29, 
the Act also defined a trade dispute as "a dispute between employers and 
workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with one or more 
[listed subjects]," such as terms and conditions of employment, termination, 
allocation of work, and discipline. II8 
In 1978 the Court of Appeal considered whether the TULRA protected the 
trade union activity involved in British Broadcasting Corp. v. Hearn. II9 The alleged 
113. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72. The Act's drafters believed that the problems in Britain's 
industrial relations were primarily caused by the unions and the tradition of non-governmental inter-
ference in indl'strial relations. See H. CLEGG, THE CHANGING SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
GREAT BRITAIN 320 (1979). 
114. TRADF UNION IMMUNITIES,SUpra note 15, at 19. The new system created the National Industrial 
Relations Court to adjudicate the provisions of the Act and established the Commission for Industrial 
Relations to act as an advisory and conciliatory agency. /d. 
115. The immunities were set out in § 132 which stated in part: 
(I) An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute shall not 
be actionable in tort on the ground only -
(a) that it induces another person to break a contract to which that other person is a party or 
prevents another person from performing such a contract, or 
(b) that it consists in his threatening that a contract (whether one to which he is a party or 
not) will be broken or will be prevented from being performed, or that he will induce 
another person to break a contract to which that other person is a party or will prevent 
another person from performing such a contract. 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72 § 132. 
In 1973, the Court of Appeal considered whether the 1971 Act protected a political strike in Sherard 
v. Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, [1973] Indus. Ct. R. 421. The court held that it could 
not issue an injunction because it was arguable that the protest was an industrial dispute under the 1971 
Act. /d. at 433. 
116. M. Moran, supra note 100, at 1. 
117. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 13. Although in 1974 the Labour 
government intended to extend the § 13 immunities to cover inducement to break all contracts, it was 
not able to muster enough support for this action until 1976 when the extension was made in § 3 of the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976, ch. 7. Trade Union Immunities, supra 
note 15, at 22; see supra note 14 for text of amended version of § 13; and supra note III for text of § 3 of 
the 1906 Act. 
118. Section 29 of the T.U.L.R.A. stated: 
(I) In this Act "trade dispute" means a dispute between employers and workers or between 
workers and workers, which is connected with one or more of the following, that is to say -
(a) terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions in which any workers are 
required to work; 
(b) engagement or non-engagement, or termination or suspension of employment or the 
duties of employment, of one or more workers; 
(c) allocation of work or the duties of employment as between workers or groups of workers 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 29. 
119. [1977] I W.L.R. 1004. 
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political dispute began when the Association of Broadcasting Staff planned to 
prevent the BBC's satellite transmission of the Football Association Cup Final to 
South Africa. The union planned to intervene in opposition to South Africa's 
apartheid policy and in accordance with the union's policy of fighting against 
discrimination in broadcasting. 120 Intervention would have interrupted service 
to all countries which used satellites to obtain the broadcast, not just South 
Africa, and the BBC sought an injunction to restrain obstruction of the broad-
cast. After the trial judge denied their request, the BBC appealed to the Court of 
Appeal, which granted the injunction. The court held that the union's action was 
not a trade dispute because it was not connected with terms and conditions of 
employment as required by Section 29(a) of the TULRA.l2l Since the union's 
action was not a trade dispute, it was coercive interference with BBC's business 
and not protected by the Section 13 immunities. 122 
As BBe illustrates, English courts interpreted the TULRA 1974 as excluding a 
purely political dispute from the definition of a trade dispute.123 Because of 
three House of Lords decisions,124 however, trade unions were still able to 
engage in activities which involved political motives. These three decisions gave 
trade unions wide immunity by interpreting the "golden formula"125 of Section 
13 broadly. 
In NWL Ltd. v. Woods ,126 the House of Lords held that as long as a dispute is a 
trade dispute within the meaning of Section 29,127 "it is immaterial whether the 
dispute also relates to other matters or has an extraneous, e.g. political or 
personal motive."128 The House of Lords expanded on its broad interpretation 
of the "golden formula" in Express Newspapers Ltd. v. MacShane. 129 In MacShane, 
120. Id. at 1008. 
121. Id. at 1016. 
122. Id. at 1011-12. According to Lord Denning, the dispute might have become a trade dispute had 
the union demanded that a clause be put into the members' employment contracts stating that they 
would not be required to take part in transmissions to South Africa. This demand might have connected 
the activity to terms and conditions of employment. Id. at lOll. In addition, Lord Roskill stated that 
although the case did not present a trade dispute, this did not mean "that there cannot be circumstances 
in which a dispute" on a matter of conscience can properly be said to be a trade dispute." Id. at 1014. 
123. See Express Newspapers v. Keys, 1980 Indus. Relations L. R. 247, in which the High Court, 
Queen's Bench Division, held that a union's call for a strike to protest government policies did not 
constitute a trade dispute. 
124. N.W.L. Ltd. v. Woods, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1294; Express Newspapapers Ltd. v. MacShane, 1980 
A.C. 672; Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] I W.L.R. 142. 
125. See supra note 109. 
126. [1979]1 W.L.R. 1294. In this case the International Transport Workers' Federation (I.T.W.F.) 
attempted to persuade workers in English and foreign ports to refuse to berth, unload, or load a vessel 
which employed poorly-paid foreign crews. The I.T.W.F. hoped to persuade the ship's owners to 
change its foreign registry and to negotiate terms and wages with I.T.W.F. crews. 
127. See supra note 118 for text of § 29. To be a trade dispute, a union activity had to be "connected 
with one or more" of the employment related subjects. Id. 
128. N. W.L. , [1979] I W.L.R. 1313. 
129. 1980 A.C. 672. 
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the court held that once a trade dispute existed under Section 29, the test of 
whether the act was done in furtherance of it was a subjective one.130 The House 
of Lords reaffirmed the MacShane test in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, 131 stating that 
the TULRA does not limit the character of a protected action as long as it is done 
in contemplation Qr furtherance of a trade dispute.132 Thus, under the TULRA, 
courts held that a purely political dispute was not protected by the immunities of 
Section 13 because it was not a trade dispute. However, a dispute which con-
tained political elements was protected so long as some aspect of the dispute was 
connected to one or more elements listed in Section 29 of the TULRA. 
B. Recent Legislation Concerning Trade Union Immunities 
Recent employment legislation in England has been described as part of "the 
Thatcher Government's 'multi'-pronged strategy to unshackle economic enter-
prise from what it considers unjustifiably restrictive trade unionism."133 The 
Conservative government believes that "the union's unique immunities and 
consequent abuse of monopoly power have greatly damaged [the] countryL] ... 
that striking and disruption must be made much more expensive for those who 
do it [and] that it must be made much harder for political extremists to gain 
control of unions."134 
As a first step, the government pushed for the enactment of the Employment 
Act 1980.135 Section 17 of the Act embodied Parliament's negative reaction to the 
NWL, MacShane, and Duport decisions.136 The purpose of Section 17 was to limit 
the scope of tort immunity for secondary action by providing that the Section 13 
immunities do not apply where a person induces a breach of contract, other than 
a contract of employment, through secondary action unless certain requirements 
/d. 
130. /d. at 686-87. As Diplock proposed the test: 
If the party who does the act honestly thinks at the time he does it that it may help one of the 
parties to the trade dispute to achieve their objectives and does it for that reason, he is 
protected by the section . 
. . . The belief of the doer of the act that it will help the side he favours in the dispute must be 
honest; it need not be wise, nor need it take account of the damage it will cause to innocent and 
disinterested third parties. 
131. [1980] I W.L.R. 142. 
132. Id. at 170. The B.B.C. case played an important role in the House of Lords' analysis of the scope 
of the "golden formula." In both N.W.L. and MacShane, the House of Lords used B.B.C. as an example 
of a dispute which was not connected to terms and conditions of employment because it was a purely 
political dispute. The B.B.C. standard was used by the House of Lords to determine whether a dispute 
involving political motives came within the definition of a trade dispute. See N.W.L., [1979]1 W.L.R. at 
1304, 1314; MacShane, 1980 1 A.C. at 682, 694. 
133. Benedictus & Newell, Employment Act 1982 - Part 1, 132 NEW L.J. 1161, 1161 (1982). 
134. Hoskyns, The Corrupting Power ojImmunity, The Times (London), Sept. 2, 1982, p. 8, col. !I. Until 
recently, Hoskyns was head of Prime Minister Thatcher's Downing Street Policy Unit. Id. 
135. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42. 
136. See 50 Halsbury's Statutes of England 2637 (3d ed. 1980). 
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are met. The section requires that the workers who take the action be employed 
by customers or suppliers of the employer in dispute. The principal purpose of 
the action must be to prevent or disrupt the supply of goods and services 
between those customers and suppliers and the employer in dispute. The section 
also requires that the action be reasonably likely to achieve this purpose.137 
Section 17 of the Employment Act 1980 received a negative reaction from trade 
unions because of the limitations it placed upon protected secondary activity.138 
InJanuary 1981, the Secretary of State for Employment issued a Green Paper 
of Trade Union Immunities.139 Its purpose was to provide the basis for a public 
debate concerning changes in the law which would improve industrial relations 
and thus aid in the country's economic recovery.140 The Paper expressed the 
concern of government, industry, and the general public over the excessive 
power of trade unions and the consequences of unregulated industrial ac-
tions.Hl Some of the proposed areas for change included the tort immunity 
granted to unions as entities in Section 14 of the 1974 Act, the remaining 
immunities provided for secondary action, and the definition of a trade dispute. 
The Paper also discussed the possibility of converting the legal framework of 
industrial relations to a system of positive rights. 142 
Regarding purely political disputes or disputes with political elements, the 
Paper argued that the current law allowed far too much scope for a union strike 
designed to make a political statement or to exert pressure on the govern-
ment.H3 Two proposals to limit this scope were offered: (1) to change the Section 
29 requirement so that a trade dispute would have to be "wholly or mainly" 
related (not merely "connected") to the listed subjects; and (2) to remove the 
immunity entirely for disputes containing any political elements.144 The Paper 
recognized, however, the difficulty in defining the term "political" and that 
either proposal would restrict some industrial actions which were directed at 
terms and conditions of employment. 145 
Based in part upon the Green Paper's discussion, the government introduced 
the Employment Bill 1982.146 The Bill, designed to "curb the number of continu-
ing abuses of trade union power,"147 included provisions to provide compensa-
137. Su Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42. § 17; TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES. supra note 15. at 24. 
138. Benedictus. Recent Developments in Collective Labour lAw - Industrial Action, 133 NEW L.J. 579. 
580 (1983). 
139. TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES. supra note 15. 
140. Id. at 92. 
141. Id. at 2. 
142. Id. at 27-82. 
143. Id. at 50. 
144. Id. at 50-51. 
145. Id. 
146. Benedictus Be Newell. Proposals for Industrial Relations Legislation. 132 New L.J. 6 (1982). 
147. /d. 
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tion for employees dismissed because they did not join closed shops, to subject 
unions to liability for up to £250,000, and to restrict the definition of a trade 
dispute.148 Despite the opposition of the Trades Union Congress,H9 Parliament 
enacted the Employment Act 1982150 in October 1982. Section 15 repealed 
Section 14 of TULRA 1974, thus subjecting union funds to liability.151 In 
addition, several provisions affected the status of politically motivated activities. 
Most important, the definition of a trade dispute in Section 29 of TULRA 1974 
was limited in the following ways in order to exclude political strikes. The section 
was amended so that trade disputes are defined as disputes "between workers 
and their employer," thus limiting cases of secondary action which were formerly 
protected. In addition, disputes "between workers and workers" are ommited 
from the definition.152 The amended definition also requires that trade disputes 
relate "wholly or mainly" to (instead of just "connected with") the items listed in 
Section 29.153 The definition of a "worker" in Section 29 of TULRA 1974 was 
changed so that it applies only to a worker employed by the particular employer 
involved in the dispute.154 These restrictive changes in the definition of a trade 
dispute affect the legality of political action by excluding disputes with political 
elements, which had been protected under MacShane. Thus, the MacShane deci-
sion is no longer good law. 
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH TREATMENT 
The recent Allied and Jacksonville decisions in the United States and the 
Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 in England have in both countries virtually 
eliminated a labor union's ability to express political sentiments through con-
148. The Times (London), July 22, 1982, at 4, col. l. 
149. See generally The Times (London), April 6, 1982, at 7, col. I; The Times (London), April 29, 
1982, at 2, col. 2; The Times (London), May 18, 1982, at 2, col. 7, which discuss the opposition of the 
Trades Union Congress to the Employment Act 1982 during the months before its enactment. The 
Trades Union Congress (T.U.C.) is a national organization of trade unions which was established in 
1868. W. FRASER, TRADE UNIONS AND SoCIETY 51 (1974). 
150. The Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46. 
151. ld. §15. 
152. ld. § 18. See supra note 13 for the former text of § 29. 
153. The Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 18. 
154. Section 18 of The Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46 amended the definition ofa worker in § 29(6) 
of the T.U.L.R.A. to read: 
6. Worker, in relation to a dispute with an employer, means -
(a) a worker employed by that employer; or 
(b) a person who has ceased to be employed by that employer where -
(i) his employment was terminated in connection with the dispute; or 
(ii) the termination of his employment was one of the circumstances giving rise to the 
dispute. 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 29(6), amended by Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, 
§ 18. 
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certed action. I55 In the United States and England, the courts and legislatures 
reached this result in order to resolve the difficult issues raised by union political 
protest activity. 
English and U.S. law have responded to the fears and complaints of employers 
that such activity restricts trade and causes them to suffer extensive monetary 
losses, thus harming the national economies. I56 In addition, U.S. courts and the 
British legislature have suppressed employees' political protests in order to curb 
what many consider the excessive power of trade unions. I57 In the United States, 
the courts and the NLRB were concerned that the 1980 ILA boycott interfered 
with the executive branch's control of foreign policy.I58 The recent U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions and English legislation were the result of similar judicial 
and legislative desires to prevent unions from interfering in foreign policy and 
trade to the detriment of the national economy. 
Although under both U.S. and English law a union cannot legally engage in a 
politically motivated strike or boycott, the U.S. Supreme Court reached this 
conclusion in a way which still protected important employee rights. Under 
Allied, neutral employers are protected from damages due to political strikes if 
the action fit the definition of a secondary boycott. I59 Under Jacksonville, federal 
courts cannot intervene to enjoin a political strike during the limited period in 
which the parties arbitrate the question of whether the work-stoppage violates 
the particular no-strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement. I60 
As evidenced by these decisions, the Court determined that politically moti-
vated actions are subject to both the protections and liabilities of federal labor 
legislation. The ILA's political motive did not mean that the boycott was illegal 
per se; 161 the Court analyzed the action's form and determined whether that form 
155. Labor unions' recognition of their inability to strike over political issues was recently demon-
strated in both countries. In the U.S., the ILA reacted to the Allied decision by calling off its four-
month-old boycott of Polish goods. Dock Workers' Boycott, 110 LAB. REL. REp. (BNA) 37 (May 10, 1982). 
Although the union had ended its Russian boycott in April 1981, it had begun boycotting Polish goods 
following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. !d. After the Supreme Court 
decided Allied on April 20, 1982, the ILA ended the Polish boycott, adding that it would "continue to 
oppose the fortes of tyranny in every lawful manner at [its] disposal." [d. Similarly, British trade unions 
have recently been hesitant to engage in political protest strikes. Instead of calling a strike to voice its 
opposition to the Employment Bill 1982, the T. U.C. distributed millions of leaflets expressing its 
negative views. The Times (London), April 29, 1982, at 2, col. 2. 
156. See Respondent's Brief at 4, 31, International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International, 
Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); Comment,supra note 5, at 278; TRADE UNION IMMUNITIES,SUpra note 15, at 
I. 
157. See generally Comment, supra note 15, at 281-85; Hoskyns, supra note 133, at 8, col. 2. 
158. Allied, 456 U.S. at 221 n.17; Allied International, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1077, 108 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 1033, 1035 (Aug. 28, 1981) ("[T]his case presents the novel situation of a labor union establish-
ing a national boycott contravening Federal policy."). See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 281-85. 
159. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text. 
161. In litigation, the ILA argued that the boyott's political motive did not make it illegal per se; see, 
e.g., Respondent's Brief at 29,Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Assn, 
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of activity was protected or prohibited under federal labor legislation.162 Its 
decisions did not restrict the basic employee rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the 
LMRA.163 Instead, the Court found the boycott subject to the limitations Con-
gress had imposed on these rights, such as the secondary boycott provisions of 
Section 8(b)(4)164 and the ability of a party to sue under Section 301 to compel 
another party's adherence to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.165 
Thus, one might argue that the Court found the ILA's politically motivated 
actions illegal under this approach while still adhering to the policies of national 
labor laws. 
Following the enactment of the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982, politically 
motivated trade disputes are no longer protected under English law. These 
disputes were formerly granted immunity under the MacShane decision if they 
fitted the definition of a trade dispute.166 One might argue that the statutory 
changes brought about by the recent legislation did more than remove immunity 
for politically motivated strikes. By merely altering a few words in the statute,167 
Parliament greatly reduced a trade union's ability to protect the interests of its 
members. According to the former immunities, union leaders were able to 
organize strikes and boycotts l68 which were effective because they frequently 
affected employers other than the one engaged in the dispute.169 Although 
individual employees did not possess rights similar to those guaranteed to Amer-
ican workers in Section 7 of the LMRA, their interests were protected by the 
effectiveness of the strikes their leaders were able to organize. By limiting the 
definition of a trade dispute, however, Parliament confined the statutory protec-
tion solely to union actions taken to protest terms and conditions of employment 
between a single employer and his or her workers,17o thus limiting the effective-
457 U.S. 702 (1982). The Supreme Court decisions did not contradict this argument. See supra notes 
46-48 &: 90 and accompanying text. 
162. S.e supra notes 46-48 &: 90 and accompanying text. 
163. Section 7 of t~ LMRA states: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, 
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that 
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this tide. 
Pub. L. No. 101, § 7, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976». 
164. Se. supra notes 9-10. 
165. See supra notes 23 &: 49-54 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. 
167. Se. supra notes 136-38 &: 150-54 and accompanying text. 
168. Both the present and former immunities protect organizers of strikes for inducing a breach of 
contract but do not protect an individual striker who breaks his or her contract of employment by 
striking. Employers rarely sue individual workers, however, because of the cost and inconvenience 
involved. In addition, courts seldom award substantial damages against individual employees. TRADE 
UNION IMMUNITIES, supra note 15, at 25. 
169. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text. 
170. Employment Act 1982, ch. 46, § 18(2)(a). 
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ness of many strikes and boycotts. Therefore, as in the United States, an English 
trade union cannot legally voice a political protest through concerted action. 
Parliament, however, made this determination as part of a legislative program 
which substantially curtailed employees' rights to engage in other concerted 
actions by limiting the statutory trade union immunities. l7l 
In responding to similar economic and foreign policy concerns over the effects 
of political strikes, the U.S. Supreme Court and British Parliament used differ-
ent methods to reach the same result. The British statutory changes have the 
effect of limiting employees' rights to engage in non-political actions because 
British labor legislation does not positively define the rights of employees to 
protect their interests through concerted action. The U.S. Supreme Court, on 
the other hand, found politically motivated activity subject to congressional 
limitations while still protecting the basic rights of employees, guaranteed in 
Section 7 of the LMRA, to engage in concerted activities. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Political labor activity involves difficult issues under both American and En-
glish industrial relations laws. Although the two legal systems have found recent 
political strikes illegal, they have addressed the issue in ways which reflect their 
different labor policies. 
In England, recent employment legislation eliminated the ability of trade 
unions to engage in political strikes or boycotts. The legislative changes, how-
ever, went beyond this goal and substantially limited other trade union rights. 
The "negative" protection provided to unions by statutory immunities was re-
duced through modification of statutory definitions. 
In the United States, on the other hand, the Supreme Court examined the 
form in which the union expressed its political protest. By so doing, the Court 
illustrated that politically motivated labor activity is subject to the protections and 
prohibitions of federal labor law. In this way, the Court limited unions' abilities 
to voice political protests while still protecting their essential right to engage in 
other concerted activities. 
Paula M. Sarro 
171. Benedictus & Newell. supra note 133. at 1161. 
